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1. Why phenomenology? 
Phenomenology’s central insight—for some radical, for others merely bromidic—is that 
affectivity is not an accouterment of human existence.1 A fit of anger is not the addition of 
an affective layer that affects our behavior, cognition, or perception. A sad mood is not a 
mere coloration of an otherwise affectively neutral existence. And contempt is not the taking 
up of an attitude, one which it would make no difference to us had we been unable to 
assume to it. Emotions, moods, sentiments, and feelings are not accidents of human 
existence—they are not mere “accompanying phenomena” (Begleitphänomenen) (Heidegger 
1927/19762 139/178; cf. Sartre 1939/2004	12, 60).2 We do not wear them or put them on. 
They do not happen to us. It is we who happen through them.  																																																								
1  “Phenomenology” means different things to different people. Often, it is used to denote the 
movement in the history of philosophy that originated with Edmund Husserl. At other times, and 
especially within the context of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, the term is used to 
designate whatever first-personally appears to someone. In this paper, I use the term in a third (but 
related) sense: “phenomenology” refers to the type of examination of human existence that takes the 
first-personal character of experience to be fundamental to that examination (see also Dahlstrom, 
Elpidorou, and Hopp 2015, 1-2). Phenomenology, understood in this sense, studies the contents and 
structures of human experience both in order to clarify their (immanent) character and to understand 
how exactly such contents and structures are world-disclosing or world-constituting.  
2  References to the following works by Sartre will be indicated by the abbreviations 
(initialisms) of their English titles followed by the pagination of the English translation: Sketch for a 
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Phenomenology’s insistence of the centrality of affectivity goes beyond the 
acceptance of the more or less undeniable fact that our everyday existence is permeated by 
affective experiences. Yes, we are beings for whom the world matters. Yes, we are constantly 
affected, moved, seduced, or taken in by the vicissitudes of ours and others’ affective 
experiences. Yet the presence of affectivity signals more than just the presence of various 
phenomenal qualities and their influences. The very fact that we can be emotionally affected 
is significant. It is revealing, according to phenomenology, of our very own human nature. 
Emotions make our existence recognizably human but, at the same time, they are there 
because we are the type of agents who are open to such experiences. The presence of 
emotions (and affective phenomena in general) is the premise of a transcendental argument, 
one that seeks to lay bare the structure of human existence. Phenomenology is not just 
serious about studying affectivity. As a study of human existence, phenomenology is 
necessarily a study in affectivity.  
It is precisely this last point that separates a phenomenological approach on 
affectivity from other historical and contemporary takes on affectivity. From the perspective 
of phenomenology, one cannot come to terms with the nature of affectivity without 
understanding human existence. Likewise, one cannot come to terms with human existence 
without understanding the nature of affectivity. Practical engagements, scientific endeavors, 
familial and political interactions are all predicated on the fact that we are beings who are 
capable of being affectively attuned to ourselves, to the world, and to others. If 
phenomenology is correct to assign such a role to affectivity, then philosophical accounts of 
affectivity that take emotions to be “a coherent and autonomous domain of philosophical 
inquiry, with its own phenomena to be explained, problems to be explored” (Garber 2017, 
13) are, in a sense, too ‘shallow.’ They fail to understand affectivity for what it really is: a 
constitutive part of human existence, one that pervades and determines every facet of 
human life, including theoretical (scientific or philosophical) reasoning about affectivity 
itself. 																																																																																																																																																																					
Theory of the Emotions (STE), The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description (TE), 
The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination (IPPI), and Being and Nothingness: An Essay 
in Phenomenological Ontology (BN). References to all other works by Sartre will be indicated by the 
original publication date followed by the date of the English translation. All page citations are to the 
English editions. 
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1.1. Phenomenology’s promise 
In the introduction to his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre affirms the distinctive 
potential of phenomenology. He criticizes the psychology of his time and attempts to show 
how a phenomenological approach can overcome the limitations and difficulties of a solely 
empirical study of emotions and human existence. For Sartre, such a scientific approach is 
fundamentally limited. It can offer us extremely detailed descriptions of the antecedents, 
correlates, and concomitants of emotions. It can provide us with a rich account of the bodily 
manifestations or expressions of emotions. Yet it remains impotent in delivering the essence 
of emotions and thereby in delineating the nature of human existence. 
Sartre’s dismissiveness of psychology is a corollary of his understanding of what type 
of enterprise psychology is. Wrongly in my eyes, but inconsequential for present purposes, 
Sartre takes psychology to be a discipline that remains entirely on an empirical plane. It 
concerns itself with the amassment of facts about the human psyche. Importantly, such facts 
are, Sartre contends, (1) fragmentary, insofar as they are disconnected from each other; (2) 
non-significant, insofar as they are not indicative of that in virtue of which they hold (i.e., 
their grounds); and (3) non-essential, insofar as they can only describe accidental features of 
human existence. These three characteristics of the fruits of psychology render it 
irredeemably problematic as a science of human nature and existence. 
First, Sartre maintains that facts about emotions (or indeed facts about any aspect of 
human psychology) are not given to the empirical researcher as a synthetic whole. Insofar as 
the researcher remains within the domain of science, the facts can never add up to a unified 
conception of human existence. As long as psychology stays faithful to its empirical method, 
it can never weave together a holistic picture of human existence for such a picture requires 
the acceptance of non-empirical claims and attitudes (STE 7, 13). What is more, the findings 
of psychology are holistically determined through and through: they “presuppose man and 
the world, and cannot take on their true meaning unless those two notions have first been 
elucidated” (STE 7-8). Any description of human nature is already inflected by human nature 
itself (STE 5, 9). 
Second, facts as these are delivered by psychology are, for Sartre, non-significant. By 
that, he means that they are taken to signify nothing beyond themselves (STE 11). A 
scientific approach has to accept such facts at face value. They simply are. And they are what 
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they are—nothing less but importantly nothing more (STE 12). For Sartre, however, “every 
human fact is of its essence significant” (STE 11). Any manifestation of consciousness 
(emotional or otherwise) is meaningful. It points beyond itself. It is grounded in and involves 
human existence as such (STE 12).  
Third and related, by failing to take facts about our affective lives as significant, 
psychology cannot deliver what is essential about them. On the contrary, a proper study of 
emotions requires a transcendental attitude; it requires that one is able to get beyond the 
particular facts of emotional consciousness. By its very nature, however, psychology does 
not inquire into the conditions of the possibility of affectivity (STE 5). It does not disclose 
the structures of human existence that render affectivity possible. And by failing to do, it 
inevitably fails to come to terms with human reality. The structures of human consciousness 
(or existence) in their essential character are never elucidated. 
Phenomenology, Sartre contends, does not succumb to the problems of psychology. 
Following Husserl and Heidegger, he maintains that phenomenology is uniquely suited to 
interrogate affective phenomena and in doing so to “carry out an analysis of the ‘human 
reality’” (STE 9). Phenomenology alone can “go beyond the psychic, beyond the situation of 
man in the world, even to the very source of man, of the world and of the psychic” (STE 8). 
It can ask “what must a consciousness be, that emotions should be possible, perhaps that it 
should even be necessary?” (STE 11) And it can deliver, or so Sartre contends. It can show 
that and how emotions are “an organized form of human existence,” a “complete 
modification of the ‘being-in-the-world’” (STE 12, 63). 
 
1.2. The plan 
The present paper takes seriously Sartre’s endorsement of phenomenology and sets out, 
firstly, to explicate the Sartrean account of emotions and affectivity and, secondly, to present 
what Sartre’s understanding of affectivity reveals about the nature of human existence. 
Ultimately, this is a paper of different aims. Section 2 is a necessary note on the notions of 
unreflective consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness—both of which are 
indispensable to Sartre and of paramount importance to the phenomenologist. Section 3 
offers a brief and accessible presentation of Sartre’s account of emotions as this advanced, 
largely, in his Sketch. Section 4 is an exercise in Sartrean scholarship. It offers a detailed 
exploration of various themes related to Sartre’s account of emotions. It exposes and 
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attempts to resolve a number of both interpretative and philosophical difficulties that arise 
from that text. Whereas Section 3 will be of use primarily to those (lucky ones!) who have 
not yet been initiated in Sartre’s views of emotions, Section 4 is aimed for the enthusiasts. 
Finally, Section 5 goes beyond the letter of Sartre’s presentation of the nature emotions. The 
Sketch presupposes a view of human nature that is never fully articulated. The aim of this 
section is to make such a view explicit and to argue for the foundational place that 
frustration occupies in Sartre’s picture of affective existence.  
It is not possible to cover everything that Sartre has said about emotions in a single 
paper. Sartre’s philosophical and literary productivity is extraordinary. For that reason, I shall 
restrict my attention primarily to his philosophical writings in the late 1930s and early 
1940s—passing references will also be made to some of his literary works from that period 
when apposite. These are the writings that deal with the topic of affectivity most explicitly 
and which have proven, at least within the context of the philosophy of emotion, to be the 
most influential (e.g., Solomon 2006; Wollheim 1999). Saint Genet, Critique of Dialectical Reason, 
and The Family Idiot, just to name three of Sartre’s later works, provide indispensible insights 
into Sartre’s more mature views about the power of circumstances (social, political, and 
familial) to condition human existence. Any account of Sartre’s views on affectivity that 
purports to be complete must take them into consideration. All the same, an essay on 
Sartre’s views on affectivity, even if it focuses on his early works, is both valuable in its own 
right (as a theory of affective existence) and as an introduction to Sartre’s rich and variegated 
thought. 
 
2. A word or two about consciousness 
Within philosophy, metacognition—i.e., the thinking that we do about our own mental 
states and processes—can often take pride of place. It is used, for example, in attempts to 
settle the ontology of consciousness, to determine the limits of reason and knowledge, and 
even to explicate the bounds of our minds. However advanced and philosophically 
propitious such “inwards” attitude may appear to be, it is not commonplace. Much of our 
behavior takes place in the absence of such metacognition. For the most part, we act, think, 
feel, and perceive without being explicitly aware of our acts of thinking, feeling, and 
perception. In the midst of things and activities, we do not assume the perspective of an 
interrogating subject. The prevalence and importance of unreflective behavior is a point that 
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Sartre is at pains making in the Sketch. And it is a continuation of themes already defended in 
The Transcendence of the Ego.  
It is important not to misunderstand Sartre’s claim. To say that everyday conduct is 
for the most part unreflective is not tantamount to claiming that we often act in an 
unconscious manner (STE 36, 38). Our actions, thoughts, feelings, sensations, etc., are lived 
by us. We experience them; they are given to us in their various affective or phenomenal 
guises. Still, the fact that we are engaged in unreflective conduct means that while we live 
through such experiences, we are attracted or absorbed by the world and others, by our 
bodies and our thoughts and desires (STE 36). We are not explicitly aware of ourselves as 
being the subjects of our various experiences. Our consciousness is not being folded onto 
itself; it is not made the positional object of itself; we are not, in other words, conscious of 
ourselves as being conscious, as having this or that thought, this or that feeling and 
sensation.  
At the same time, it should be emphasized that our feelings, sensations, thoughts, 
actions, wills and desires are not only our own but they are experienced as such. Such a 
dimension of mineness is, however, given to us not in an explicit (or thematic) manner but 
pre-reflectively. While ordering my coffee, for example, I am not explicitly aware of myself 
as uttering a phrase, giving money, or standing in front of the counter. Still, in a non-
objectifying manner, I am aware of those experiences as being my own: I do not render them 
the focus of my consciousness, yet I am pre-reflectively (non-explicitly or non-thetically) 
aware of the fact that those experiences are mine (TE 48-9). Consciousness need not be 
made into the intentional object of itself in order to be aware of itself. Indeed, every act of 
consciousness contains a pre-reflective awareness of itself. Or as Sartre puts it, “every 
positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of 
itself.” (BN liii; see also TE 46) 
 
3. A sketch of the Sketch 
What goes for our everyday behavior goes for emotional experiences. Such experiences are 
primarily and for the most part unreflective. Hence, Sartre denies that emotional 
consciousness should be modeled after reflective consciousness. An emotion could involve a 
reflective element, when, for example, we direct our attention either to the emotion itself or 
to ourselves as the subject of the emotion, but most often it is not. During most emotional 
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episodes, we are only non-thetically (pre-reflectively) conscious of ourselves (STE 34, 36-8, 
42; cf. TE 40-1, 44-9, 56).  
What is more, in its typical form, emotional consciousness is not a “state of mind” 
(STE 34): it is neither a state nor is it about our minds. Emotions are not grasped or 
conceptualized; rather, they are lived (IPPP 68-9). They are embodied and enactive ways of 
interacting with worldly objects, others, and ourselves. In fear, my relationship to the world 
is transformed through my body: possibilities for actions are foreclosed; some items appear 
within reach; whereas others, the more foreboding ones, render my world a cold, 
inhospitable place and I wish them to disappear. During boredom, the world stands at a 
distance from me (Elpidorou 2015, 2017a, 2017b). It does not fulfill me; it leaves me empty. 
And during envy, I am pushed and pulled by the allure of objects that are not in my 
possession; I become resentful of someone else’s status and suddenly my possessions are 
drained of value. What is at stake during such emotional episodes and many others is the 
world—not our minds (see also Sartre 1939/1970, 5; TE 56, 58-9). 
Emotions are specific ways of “apprehending [i.e., relating to and experiencing] the 
world” which are brought about spontaneously, and via the mediation of our bodies, by the 
antecedent experience of an insurmountable difficulty (STE 35). In the Sketch, most 
emotions are understood to be ways in which we transform our world by transforming our 
consciousness of it. Other emotions—e.g., the sudden emotions of horror, terror, or awe—
are manifestations of a change in the manner in which we relate to the world. In either case, 
emotions constitute an existential transition: a move from one way of existing in the world 
to another. 
What exactly is the change that emotions (either through our own involvement or on 
their own) bring about? To answer this question, we first need to consider how Sartre 
conceives of our everyday concernful existence. Borrowing a term from Kurt Lewin, and 
drawing upon Heidegger’s notion of Zeugwelt, Sartre calls such existence “hodological” (STE 
38). It is hodological insofar as the world is perceived to contain hodoi, i.e., roads or 
pathways: worldly entities are already given to us as a part of a causal and pragmatic nexus. 
Or as Sartre writes, “From this point of view, the world around us […] appears to be all 
furrowed with strait and narrow paths leading to such and such determinate end” (STE 39). 
When engaging in the world in this way, the world appears to be both instrumental and 
deterministic. It is instrumental because entities appear to stand in means-ends relationships. 
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In order to attain the ends that one desires, one first needs to secure the already prescribed 
means that lead to those ends. At the same time, the world appears to us to be deterministic: 
there is an order to the world for such-and-so means lead to such-and-so ends.  
Due to its deterministic character, the world of our everyday concernful existence 
can be inflexible and unyielding to our needs. Not everything goes in such a world; there are 
rules, physical or social, that need to be followed. To achieve a desired end, we need to 
pursue the means that will lead to it. Each desired end, however, is to some extent 
difficult—its difficulty is a function of how readily accessible the means that will bring it 
about are to us (STE 38-9; BN 504-08). Sometimes we are capable of overcoming the 
difficulties that we face; we find ways to acquire the necessary means, thereby realizing our 
desired ends. Other times, however, our difficulties persist. We wish to attain an end but are 
unable to achieve the necessary means. When faced with such situations, ordinary (i.e., 
practical or deterministic) actions cannot resolve the experienced difficulties and our desires 
remain frustrated. It is precisely in such situations that emotions arise.  
The onset of an emotion changes the manner in which we relate to the world. We 
cease to relate to the world in a pragmatic or deterministic attitude. Instead, we “live it as 
though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by 
deterministic processes but by magic”  (STE 40). The world of emotions is magical in at least 
three senses. First, emotional consciousness confers, magically, onto worldly entities or 
situations qualities different than the ones that they were perceived to have in their 
instrumental guise (STE 41). “To become conscious of Paul as hateful, irritable, sympathetic, 
disturbing, attractive, repulsive, etc., is to confer on him a new quality” (IPPI 69). Juicy 
grapes turn into sour ones; innocuous objects become repulsive; threats are made to vanish; 
responsibilities and duties are overlooked or rendered irrelevant; and familiar situations 
become overwhelming. 
Second, the world of our emotions is magical insofar as it is not pragmatic or 
deterministic. That is to say, the world that emotions reveal is not one ruled by causal and 
inflexible processes and rules (STE 60). In such a world, we are able to achieve our ends 
without procuring the previously necessary (practical) means, as in the case of passive fear 
where we are able to negate a threat (e.g., a ferocious beast running towards us) not by 
confronting it but by fainting and thereby forgetting it. We can also absolve ourselves of the 
pressing demand to acquire some difficult end by renouncing the end itself, as in the case of 
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passive sadness where we come to see the world as lacking in value or significance and thus 
we free ourselves of the responsibility of acting (STE 41). Pablo Ibbieta, the protagonist of 
Sartre’s “The Wall,” adapts a similar attitude. Imprisoned and awaiting what appears to be 
his unavoidable execution, he is left with no power other than the power over his own 
consciousness. He cannot escape death for he cannot release himself from bondage, but he 
can relieve himself of his anxiety and dread by coming to see his life as having little or no 
worth (see also Fell [1965, 17-8] for a similar point). 
Third and last, emotional conduct is magical insofar as it is “not effectual” (STE 41). 
Fainting during passive fear does not make the threat disappear; it merely renders it 
forgotten in consciousness. And crying during active sadness does not make things better; it 
just temporally and cathartically relieves us of from having to deal with the cause of our 
sadness. Emotional consciousness does not materially change the world. Rather, by changing 
itself, it changes how the world is experienced and lived by us.  
Emotions are functional: by changing the way in which we relate to the world, they 
constitute embodied and unreflective attempted solutions to pressing and insurmountable 
difficulties. By delivering us a world in which deterministic processes no longer hold, they 
aim to make the difficulties that we previously encountered, and which we could not 
otherwise solve, magically disappear.3 In a note for the press that summarizes the underlying 
philosophical ideas of the stories that comprise The Wall, Sartre speaks of the impossibility of 
escaping our existence. He writes: 
 
Nobody is willing to look Existence in the eyes. Here are five small routes away from 
her – tragic or comic, five lives. . . . Those flights are stopped by a wall; to run away 
from Existence, still implies to exist. Existence is a whole from which man cannot 
																																																								
3  As I argue elsewhere (Elpidorou, 2016), it is best to understand emotions as attempted 
solutions to difficulties that are made present to us most often within a deterministic world but also 
sometimes within a magical world (as in the case of horror and wonder). In some cases, emotional 
consciousness will succeed in solving the perceived difficulties; in other cases, it will not. The claim 
that emotions are attempted solutions (sometimes successful, other times not) to encountered 
difficulties is consistent with Sartre’s contention that emotions are purposeful and functional. 
Emotions can be invested with a purpose (or a function) even if their purpose (or function) is not 
met, and, indeed, even if such a purpose (or function) can never be met (see, e.g., Neander, 2017). 
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escape. (Quoted in Jongeneel 2009, 342)4 
We cannot escape reality. But through our emotions we can temporarily transform it and 
seek relief from its frustrations. Emotions are the all-too-human temporary reprieves from 
the weight of our concernful (practical, praxical, and social) human existence. This then, in a 
nutshell, is Sartre’s view of emotions.  
 
4. Filling in the Sketch 
The devil, of course, is in the details. Sartre’s Sketch is succinct, to a fault. It is also radical, 
breaking off from the tradition in various and important ways. It is no surprise then that the 
Sketch has been both often misunderstood and the subject of many objections. In this 
section, my aim is to fend off potential misunderstandings of the text by expounding upon 
certain themes of Sartre’s account that I take to be crucial for a proper grasp of his position.5  
 
Purpose  
Emotions are functional insofar as they serve a purpose. But they are neither prudential (or 
calculative) actions nor evolutionarily adapted mechanisms. They are not the former because 
the subject does not deliberatively bring them about; even if we embody and enact them, we 
do not leave the unreflective plane while doing so (STE 36).6 They are not the latter because 
emotion’s function is personal and not one that is related to reproductive fitness. Indeed, an 
evolutionary perspective misses, completely for Sartre, the reality of emotions. Emotions are 
																																																								
4  The last line of this quote is, of course, a line from Nausea. Sartre provides his own account 
of the meaning of that line in an entry from his War Diaries dated Thursday, December 7, 1939. See 
Sartre 1983/1999, 107.  
5  I shall not, however, discuss the extent to which emotions involve (or are acts in) bad faith. 
For the similarities between Sartre’s account of the emotions and bad faith, see Richmond 2010. 
Illuminating discussions of bad faith can be found in Bernasconi 2006, Ch. 4; Cox 2006, 101-4; 
Eshleman 2008a and 2008b; Manser 1987; Perna 2003; Santoni 1995 and 2008; and Webber 2009.  
6  During an emotional episode we are not explicitly aware of the fact that consciousness has 
changed itself in order to escape the perceived difficulty (STE 52). We are unreflectively engaging with the 
world both before and after the onset of emotional consciousness (STE 36). Even though “a non-
thetic consciousness of itself remains,” such awareness is both an unavoidable consequence of the 
structure of consciousness and too subtle to make us recognize emotions for what they really are: 
namely, spontaneous and embodied attempts to overcome instrumental difficulties (STE 52). Only a 
“purifying reflection” may reveal to us the true nature of emotions, but such an attitude, Sartre 
emphasizes, “is rare” (STE 61).  
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neither possible nor meaningful outside the context of human (i.e., conscious and not merely 
animal or biological) existence.  
 
Belief 
Emotions essentially involve belief in the reality and significance of the magical world. The 
new qualities, relationships, and demands that have been magically conferred upon the world 
are taken as real and not as projected by us; they matter to us and we believe in them. 
Emotional consciousness, Sartre tells us, “lives the new world it has thereby constituted – 
lives it directly, commits itself to it, and suffers from the qualities that the concomitant 
behavior has outlined” (STE 51). An emotional episode is thus no “playacting” (STE 50). 
Or, if it is a kind of playacting, “the play,” Sartre notes, “is one that we believe in,” i.e., it is 
one that we do not recognize as play (STE 41).  
Such a conclusion has an important corollary. It shows that “behaviour pure and 
simply is not emotion” (STE 48). Emotions involve, essentially and not accidentally, bodily 
actions and physiological changes. Yet they are much more than that. They also involve 
volitional and perceptual changes, and various cognitive attitudes, the most important of 
which is, as mentioned above, a belief in the reality and significance of the magical world 
(STE 50). Attitudinal theories of emotions come closest to Sartre’s claim that emotions are 
ways in which the world is transformed through our bodies and attitudes (Claparède 1928; 
Deonna & Teroni 2012, ch. 7).  
 
Force and attraction 
Emotions are both captivating and totalizing. On the one hand, emotional “consciousness,” 
Sartre tells us, “is caught in its own snare” (STE 52). Emotional consciousness lives in the 
magical world that itself constitutes and by doing so, it “tends to perpetuate that world” 
(STE 53). Consequently, we have little control over an occurrent emotion: “One cannot get 
out of it as one pleases; it fades away of itself, but one cannot put a stop to it” (STE 49). On 
the other hand, emotional consciousness has a profound and totalizing effect on our 
existence. Emotions are not isolated (or static) states of consciousness. They are 
comprehensive insofar as they transform, completely, our relationship to the world. “The 
onset of emotion is a complete modification of the ‘being-in-the-world.’” (STE 63; see also 
STE 54). That is the reason why Sartre insists of speaking of the “world” of emotions (STE 
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54) and likens them both to worlds of madness and to dreams.7 Not only are we “spell-
bound” by the horrifying (STE 49), but also horror only occurs in “a world which is such 
that all the things existing in it are magical by nature” (STE 59; see also Elpidorou, 2016). 
 
Action 
As magical transformations of the world that seek to offer us a way out of an experienced 
difficulty (STE 61), emotions are not happenings or passions, even if they appear to be so to 
the unreflective consciousness that lives the emotional world. Instead, they are doings: 
“emotion is not a physiological tempest; it is a reply adapted to the situation; it is a type of 
conduct” (BN 445). Properly understood, for Sartre, we make ourselves emotional. Or stated 
more radically, emotions are our own choices. As such, we bear responsibility for them 
(Sartre 1996/2007, 29). 
To call emotions “choices” is not deny that emotions are spontaneous, captivating, 
and even in a sense involuntary reactions to a situation. When we are confronted with a 
pressing and unyielding situation, we have no alternative but to emote; and when we do so, 
we are most often captive by our own emotional consciousness. Then in what sense are 
emotions free choices? Briefly, the answer is this: the onset of emotions depends on the 
difficulties that we encounter in our concernful existence. But such difficulties are personal 
difficulties: they are there only because we have antecedently organized our world in a 
manner that is already mattering to us. Through our actions and decisions, we continuously 
develop and commit to our projects and self-identity. We decide what ends are worth 
pursuing and which are not. Consequently, situations will be frustrating or difficult only to 
the extent that we have freely invested in them and are involved in our projects.  “Freedom 
gives itself things as adverse” (BN 508). Emotions are thus choices because we have 
constructed our world in a way that the frustration of certain ends would inevitably lead to 
the rise of emotional consciousness. To put it in another way, it is we who have freely laid 
down the roads of our hodological world.  																																																								
7  Sartre discusses dreams in The Imaginary (IPPI, 159-175). For a description of Sartre’s take on 
madness, one cannot do better than reading his short fictional story, “The Room” (Sartre 
1939/1969). Sartre’s description of Pierre’s madness illustrates that the world of madness has certain 
affinities to that of emotions. For instance, madness is presented as an alternative mode of existence 
compared to our everyday, concernful mode of being and as permeated by magic (see pages 27-28, 
33, 35-40).  
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Varieties of affectivity 
Emotions should be contrasted with three other affective phenomena: feelings, states, and 
dispositions. Although Sartre does not distinguish between them in the Sketch, he does in 
other works. First, feelings are ways of encountering the world as already affectively laden. 
“Every feeling is feeling about something, which is to say it aims at its object in a certain 
manner and projects onto it a certain quality” (IPPI 28; see also IPPI 69). Indeed, there is no 
affectively neutral way of existing in the world: “All perception is accompanied by an 
affective reaction” (IPPI 28; see also IPPI 139). Such feelings are disclosive of the world and 
they can be thought of as a species of knowledge (IPPI 69). Feelings enhance the world but 
they do not change it: “when they disappear – as in the case of depersonalization – 
perception remains intact, things are not touched, and yet the world is singularly 
impoverished” (ibid.). But feelings are not emotions. They are not disruptive. They do not 
require that we give up our instrumental way of relating to the world. We can experience 
feelings and at the same time act in prudential ways.  
 In contrast to feelings, which are ways of experiencing the world, Sartre discusses 
states, which are objects of reflection (TE 61-8; BN 162-4): “If I hate Peter,” Sartre writes, 
“my hatred of Peter is a state that I can apprehend by reflection” (TE 61). To say that hate 
as a state is an object of reflection does not mean merely that we are able to reflect on it. 
This would not distinguish the state of hate from the feeling of repugnance or the emotion of 
anger. Sartre’s claim is stronger. As a state, hatred’s existence is “relative to reflective 
consciousness” (TE 66). It exists because of reflective consciousness. But that does not mean 
that it exists only in those moments during which we are reflecting on it. Rather, hate is 
constituted by reflection (TE 80-1)—it is the manner in which reflection unifies 
consciousness (TE 76-7)—and as such the state has both a past and a future (TE 62). The 
state of hate is manifested in different feelings, thoughts, and actions but it is something 
over and above all of them. It is not exhausted by any of them, nor even by their disjunction. 
He writes: 
 
My hatred was given in and by each movement of disgust, of repugnance, and of anger, but 
at the same time it is not any of them. My hatred escapes from each of them by affirm its 
permanence. […] Hatred is credit for an infinity of angry or repulsed consciousnesses in the 
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past and in the future. (TE 63) 
 
Thus, for Sartre, consciousness does not discover in itself hate (or any other state for that 
matter). Nor is it correct to say that it is my hate that makes me feel the way I do. Instead, 
hate is the transcendent product of our own (reflective) consciousness (see also Barnes 1984 
and Webber 2009, ch. 2). It is by reflecting on our feelings (present, past, and anticipated) 
that we come to the conclusion that we hate a person (TE 81).  
 Finally, affective dispositions are taken to be qualities of the ego—“they qualify my 
personality,” Sartre writes (BN 162). Just like states, they are the products of reflective 
consciousness. However, whereas states unify consciousnesness, dispositions unify states 
and actions. “When we have experienced hatred several times toward different persons…we 
unify these diverse manifestations by intending a psychic disposition for producing them” 
(TE 70). A disposition is taken to be “the substratum of the states”—in other words, that 
which can give rise to a state (or action) when it is actualized (ibid.). In The Transcendence of the 
Ego, Sartre calls qualities “optional unities of states” and suggests that although we might 
think of ourselves as having such dispositions, we do not have to and perhaps it is even a 
mistake to think so (TE 70-1). This attitude about qualities (and dispositions) is not repeated 
in Being and Nothingness (BN 162-4). There qualities, states, and action are treated as being 
equally real (see also Webber 2009, 24-29).  
 
 
5. Frustrating lives  
Is this it?  
Is this it?  
Is this it?  
— The Strokes 
 
My project, so far, has been largely reconstructive. I have been following Sartre closely in an 
attempt to present accurately and, to the extent that is possible, comprehensively his early 
view on emotions. In this section, I take a different approach. Instead of filling in the details 
of Sartre’s account, I go beyond his account by offering an interpretation of what such an 
account reveals about human existence. The task of this section is not reconstructive, but 
constructive: it builds a conception of human existence out of the Sketch. Although the issue 
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of human existence, in its various concrete and interpersonal manifestations, is explored 
perspicaciously and with remarkable detail and vividness in Being and Nothingness, there is 
merit in approaching this issue from the perspective of emotions: it reveals features of 
human existence that otherwise one might have missed.  
 
 
5.1. Positive emotions: a feature, not a bug 
Objections to Sartre’s account of the emotions abound in the literature. Here are three 
common ones. First, his account is limited in various respects: it does not apply to affective 
phenomena other than emotions, such as moods, emotional dispositions, or sentiments 
(Weberman 1996); it has no room for mild emotions (Murdoch 1950); and it applies only to 
extreme negative or maladapted emotions (Fell 1965; Hanly 1975; Weberman 1996; 
Wollheim 1999). Second, his account is internally inconsistent—within the pages of the 
Sketch one finds two contradictory descriptions of emotions (Solomon 2006; Richmond 
2010). Third, his distinction between an instrumental world and an emotional world runs 
aground basic phenomenological facts: not only is the instrumental world affectively laden 
but emotions can be effectual (Anders 1950; Fell 1965; Lee 1972).   
I cannot deal with all of these objections here. Nor do I wish to (for some attempts 
to do so, see Barrett 1982; Emerick 1999). I have already offered the beginning of responses 
to at least two of these objections. For instance, even if Sartre does not speak of dispositions 
in the Sketch, he does so elsewhere. Furthermore, our brief discussion of feelings reveals that 
it is a mistake to take the instrumental world to be affectively neutral. What is more, Sartre 
does offer—albeit in the briefest manner—a description of two other kinds of emotions, 
“subtle emotions” and “weak emotions” (STE 55), and as such one could reconstruct an 
account of those two types of emotions.8 Last, the issue of whether the Sketch offers an 
inconsistent account of the emotions has been discussed elsewhere (Richmond 2010; 																																																								
8  Both subtle and weak emotions could be construed as emotional reactions that, in 
opposition to the other (more extreme) emotions that Sartre considers in the Sketch, do not involve a 
magical transformation of the world (see Fell 1965, 25-8). Of course, one could argue that subtle and 
weak emotions are not emotions proper, at least not for Sartre, for during such experiences our 
instrumental world has not been profoundly transformed. If one accepts this view about subtle and 
weak emotions, then the extension of the term “emotion” should be restricted so that it only applies 
to extreme emotional reactions that transform our instrumental world into a magical one (Barrett 
1982). 
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Hatzimoysis 2014). Indeed, I myself have offered a reading of the Sketch according to which 
there is one account of emotions that can accommodate all examples of emotions that Sartre 
considers, including the sudden ones of horror and awe (Elpidorou, 2016). I shall spare the 
reader from exposure to unnecessary repetition. 
Still, there is one objection that within the context of this paper needs to be 
considered. At first sight, Sartre’s account seems particularly ill-suited for what we might call 
“positive emotions.” These are emotions that are not only positively valenced, but also ones 
that arise when things are going well for us, when our desires appear to be fulfilled. Sartre 
himself recognizes this issue in the Sketch but tries to undermine its severity by arguing that, 
despite appearances to the contrary, such emotions are not fundamentally different, at least 
in terms of their function and significance, from negative emotions. After distinguishing 
between joy-feeling (joie-sentiment) and joy-emotion (joy-émotion), Sartre claims that the latter is 
characterized by a type of “impatience” (STE 46). He explains: 
 
…the joyful subject is behaving very much like a man in a state of impatience. He 
cannot keep still, makes innumerable plans, begins to do things which he 
immediately abandons etc. For in fact this joy has been called up by an apparition of 
the object of his desires. He has been told that he has won a considerable sum of 
money, or that he will shortly meet someone he loves and has not seen for a long 
time. But although the object is ‘imminent’ it is not yet there, it is not yet his. He is 
separated from it by a certain length of time. (ibid.) 
 
In keeping with his analysis of emotions, joy, Sartre tells us, is both a response to and an 
attempted solution to an encountered difficulty. Joy is prompted or motivated by a 
frustration. We wish that our desires are fully and completely satisfied but they are not. We 
are made to wait, but we cannot. We want the sum of money; we want our lover; and we 
want them now. Not only that, but we also want them in a way that we can never have them, 
“as an instantaneous totality” (ibid). The object of desire is close but not here. And when it 
is here, it will not be in the form that was desired. By its very nature, our object of desire is 
given to us little by little and only through continuous effort. For instance, we need to wait 
for the sum of money to arrive. We need to pay taxes on it. We need to pay our bills and 
then we need to figure whether and how to spend, save, or invest it. Faced with such a 
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difficult and frustrating situation, we become joyful. Through its embodied and enactive 
manifestations, joy transforms our world magically in order “to realize the possession of the 
desired object as an instantaneous totality” (STE 46). In doing so, joy relieves us, 
temporarily, from the difficulties that we need to overcome if we wish to remain committed 
to a project that has been partially fulfilled. Here is Sartre’s description of the lover who 
experiences joy:  
 
… a man to whom a woman has just said that she loves him may begin to dance and 
sing. In so doing he turns his mind away from the prudent and difficult behaviour he 
will have to maintain if he is to deserve this love and increase it, to gain possession of 
it through countless details (smiles, little attentions etc.). He turns away even from 
the woman herself as the living reality representative of all those delicate procedures. 
Those he will attend to later, he is now giving himself a rest. (STE 47) 
 
Joy is hence a way of dwelling in the moment, soaking up all that can be soaked up, instead 
of facing an always-demanding reality. No wonder joy feels good.  
Not many commentators on Sartre have been convinced by his description of joy. Is 
it really true that joy and other positive emotions are escapes from difficulties? Don’t such 
emotions arise precisely when things are not difficult to us? Furthermore, couldn’t there be 
instances in which a positive emotion turns us not away from the object of desire but rather 
towards it? I do not pretend that these are not important objections, ones to which a 
Sartrean view ought to attend. But my aim here is not to defend Sartre from this and other 
objections. I consider the example of joy not to express dissatisfaction with Sartre’s account 
but rather to highlight the view of human existence that underlies his account. In order to 
bring into focus such a view, Sartre’s description of positive emotions has to be accepted. 
The fact that positive emotions are reactions to frustrating situations is not a bug of Sartre’s 
account. It is a telling feature. 
 
5.2. The primacy of frustration  
I have emphasized, more than once that for the phenomenologist, affective phenomena are 
not accidental features of human existence. They are essentially constitutive of our existence 
(STE 61). Thus, the acceptance of any phenomenological account of emotions carries with it 
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a particular picture of human existence. In the case of Sartre’s account, the view of human 
existence that we find is one characterized by frustration.  
 Frustration, I wish to argue, occupies a foundational place in Sartre’s early thinking 
about affectivity. For one, frustration is the gatekeeper of our strong or extreme emotional 
reactions. It is on account of frustrating experiences that such emotions arise. “When the 
paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way” we emote (STE 39).  
Or as Adam Phillips notes, in a different context, “to be frustrated is to be maddened by 
having one’s demand negated or avoided or tantalized” (Phillips 2013, 10; emphasis added). 
In an existence devoid of frustration, nothing will appear difficult or as an obstacle to us. In 
an existence devoid of frustration, there would be, thus, no need for (Sartre’s) emotions. 
Frustration is not an emotional reaction like others; it is not on the same level as fear, anger, 
sadness, or joy. Rather, it is the ground of our emotional reactions.  
Our concernful existence is frustrating. The projects to which we have committed 
are hard and difficult, not always yielding to our plans and desires. Our interpersonal 
relations are also frustrating. Love is a conflict (BN 266), Sartre tells us, and then generalizes: 
“Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others” (BN 364; see also BN 429; cf. Sartre 
1960/1963, 14). Our lives are frustrating. And they are so out of necessity. The Sketch by 
construing emotions as escapes from difficult and frustrating situations makes this point 
clear. The capacity to have emotions is a structure of human existence. But if such a 
structure is predicated on the antecedent existence of frustration, then our human lives, 
insofar as they emotional, are frustrating. What it means to exist is to encounter frustrating 
situations. We strive to possess or to realize what we cannot have. We are thus doomed to 
experiences of frustration. 
 The fact that for Sartre positive emotions are responses to experienced frustrations 
is, I noted above, telling. What it reveals is that every fulfilled desire is always a desire that is 
only partially fulfilled. Even in cases in which things go well for us, they do not go as well as 
we desire them. The consequences of this observation for the nature of human existence are 
developed in detail in Being and Nothingness. There, Sartre tells us that consciousness (as the 
for-itself) “is perpetually determining itself not to be the in-itself” (BN 85). Consciousness is 
negatively ontologically determined by the in-itself: “it determines its being by means of a 
being which it is not” (BN 86). As such, consciousness (and consequently human existence) 
is fundamentally characterized by a lack. Sartre finds support for this idea in the very notion 
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of desire. A being that is what it is (i.e., a being that is never lacking) has no need for desires; 
it needs nothing, for it is already complete. Thus, “the existence of desire as a human fact is 
sufficient to prove that human reality is a lack” (BN 87). We desire because we are lacking. 
We do not lack because our desires are not fulfilled: “Human reality is not something which 
exists first in order afterwards to lack this or that; it exists first as lack” (BN 89). Or even 
more strongly, “The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as 
perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it” (BN 90).  
 Sartre’s discussion of positive emotions reveals a similar picture of human existence. 
Even in cases where our desires are fulfilled, a lack still persists: there is something that is 
not only missing but that cannot be had. “Hence the constant disappointment which 
accompanies repletion, the famous: ‘Is this only this’?” (BN 101) That is precisely the 
purpose of positive emotions: to help us forget the fact that human existence is marked by a 
lack. Sartre’s discussion of positive emotions thus reveals that every desire—even one that is 
fulfilled—gives rise to a frustration.  
All this might sound rather gloomy. And in, a sense, it is. Sartre was never the 
optimist. But there is more than what initially meets the eye. The very presence of frustration 
is ontologically significant for it reveals something important about our worldly and social 
existence. Our projects and others are frustrating precisely because they are already invested 
with personal meaning and significance. But not everything frustrates us. Indeed, only that 
which already matters to us can frustrate us. As such, frustration tracks when certain of our 
important desires remain unfulfilled. It informs us of when something valuable to us—i.e., 
something that we consider to be integral to our projects and goals—is outstanding, 
incomplete, or unachieved. “Only someone who gives you satisfaction can give you 
frustration,” Phillips writes (2013, 15). He adds: “You know someone matters to you if they 
can frustrate us” (ibid.). Frustration is not only the ground or precondition of our emotional 
reactions. It is also an indication of the basic fact that our existence is one that matters to us. 
 
6. Coda: No exit?  
 
Frustration, to put it simply, is something we cannot be indifferent to even if 
indifference can be one of our attempted solutions to it… The fact of frustration 
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has, that is to say, something reassuring about it. It suggests a future. (Phillips 2013, 
14) 
 
In frustration, we remain engaged with our current situation. We are engrossed by the now 
but only insofar as we wish to overcome it: we seek to reach a future point in time during 
which the difficulty that we are currently facing no longer exists. The use of instrumental 
means is one way of surpassing our frustrations, of solving our difficulties. If such means 
fail, then we turn to emotional consciousness. The onset of emotion permits us to address 
our difficulties in a magical manner. Frustration is not a dead-end in the road of existence. It 
is merely a detour: we overcome it either through prudential action or through emotional 
conduct.  
Using Sartre’s account of emotion as a clue for the nature of human existence, I have 
argued that our lives are frustrating. And frustrating lives are, well, frustrating: difficult and 
unyielding. But frustration is all too human. It reflects the fact that we have already invested 
in our world. It shows that the world personally matter to us. And lastly, it keeps us engaged 
with our situation and encountered difficulties and motivates us to go beyond them.  
However, we should not be misled to think that somehow we could do without 
frustration. “Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence.” (STE 61) 
The same can said about frustration. Even when we overcome a frustration another will 
arise. And even when a desire is fulfilled, as in the case of joy, for example, our desire still 
remains partly frustrated, for our desires are never fully fulfilled. Frustration may carry us 
beyond what we have but it always leaves something out. “Human reality is a perpetual 
surpassing toward a coincidence with itself which is never given.” (BN 89; cf. Sartre 
1960/1963, 567)  
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